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(For legal reasons, this is a 10% selection of this chapter, consisting of the 
introduction and conclusion) 
Most observers agree that there has been a dramatic increase in inequality in Russia, 
and that inequality matters. But there are many arguments as to why it is significant.  
The key question concerns the effect of the transformation of Russia on inequality and 
poverty. Marshall once characterised (and celebrated) the hyphenated society of 
democratic-welfare-capitalism as the ideal mechanism for managing the transition 
from pre-industrial to post-industrial society. This was to be accomplished by the 
political control of a capitalist economy. Inequality would grow, but the poor would 
be helped and enabled to retain their place in society. The traditional view was that it 
is economic growth that matters, particularly in relation to poverty reduction, and that 
a period of inequality within a country was a price to be paid for moving from an 
agricultural economy to a developed economy, epitomised in the Kuznets „curve‟. In 
the Russian case, the process of transformation into a capitalist economy was 
expected to generate inequality, but the simultaneous evolution of democracy would, 
it was hoped, enable citizens to vote for enough welfare support to contain the impact 
of the transformation on those at the bottom. 
In more recent times, it has become accepted that there are “varieties of 
capitalism” and that successful connections between a polity and an economy can 
come in various ways. Mid-twentieth century optimism is no longer justified. 
Inequality does not seem to have moderated in Latin America, and appears to have 
grown around the world, and particularly in the post-transition years for Central and 
East European countries. Economic growth has not delivered reductions in inequality, 
and consequently inequality has itself come to be scrutinised for its consequences. In 
a major reversal of the traditional view, there is now concern that inequality itself may 
hamper economic growth. Possible reasons cited for slower economic growth in more 
unequal societies include inefficient access to land and capital for economic 
development, the inability to adapt quickly to increasingly volatile global economic 
change, the erosion of social capital in civil society, the growth of crime and violence, 
and poorer health status for the population as a whole. 
In the long view, global inequality has shifted from within-country differences 
in the nineteenth century, to between-country differences, which now account for 
around 70 per cent of global inequality. To that extent, inequality within Russia is 
only part of the story since there has been a clear divergence of per capita incomes 
between the transition countries since 1990, with those in Central Europe, and some 
of the Baltic states moving closer to Western Europe than the CIS countries.  
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Conclusion 
The data on inequality and poverty show clearly how the transformation of both the 
Russian economy and the Russian polity has not resulted in the harmonious 
development of what TH Marshall characterised as the hyphenated society of 
democratic-welfare-capitalism. In this view inequality would grow, but the poor 
would be helped and enabled to retain their place in society. There seems little 
evidence of this being accomplished in Russia.  
Inequality grew rapidly in the 1990s in Russia. There are a variety of ways in 
which this has been measured, but the trend over time comes through clearly. In the 
last five years the rate of growth of inequality has slowed and reversed. The 
significance of this pattern varies. For macro economic issues, there is the question of 
whether inequality hampers economic growth - now becoming a new orthodoxy in 
some economic circles. However this probably depends on whether Russian economic 
growth is widely embedded, or, as is more likely the case, it is driven by export 
oriented raw materials sectors. These are likely to be far less sensitive to domestic 
inequality than the manufacturing sectors of the Asian „miracle‟ in the 1990s. 
The causes of inequality are relatively clear. Those who moved into the private 
employment sector benefited from a marked premium, as did those who were able to 
develop private non-wage economic activities. Those who remained in traditional 
employment, either manufacturing or services, suffered from wage arrears and pay 
restraint in the face of inflation that undermined the old egalitarian distribution. In 
contrast to Central European societies, the returns to education have not been strong 
in Russia, nor are gender effects pronounced. Some of these effects have been 
ameliorated in recent years - especially the reduction in wage arrears. On the other 
hand, regional inequalities have not reduced, and the impact of capital cities 
(especially the Moscow effect), and export oriented raw materials regions, remains 
substantial. However the ability of survey techniques to capture the upper end of the 
income and wealth distribution has been limited and we cannot find a clear picture of 
the rich from this general work on inequality. 
While inequality may not get in the way of current Russian economic growth, 
it clearly does have consequences for Russian individuals and households. Poverty 
has also grown rapidly, and the consequences for ordinary lives have been 
devastating. Millions have lost their lives through premature mortality, and infectious 
disease has reappeared. A whole generation has lived through a period of great 
instability and anxiety.  
It may be that rapid change in economic fortunes keeps open the possibility 
for households and individuals to secure a better future at some point, but there is 
evidence that a significant layer are now stuck in longer term poverty. This itself can 
amplify the accumulation of personal misfortunes, and give little prospect of relief 
through personal efforts. The impact of government social and regional policies and 
spending is at best neutral as to its impact on this group, and more likely worsens 
inequality through poor targeting and financial restraint. 
